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The intersections and conversations between feminist
geography and political geography have been
surprisingly few. The notion ofa feminist geopolitics
remains undeveloped in geography. This paper aims to
create a theoretical and practical space in which to
articulate a feminist geopolitics. Feminist geopolitics is
not an alternative theory ofgeopolitics, nor the usher-
ing in ofa new spatial order, but is an approach to
global issues with feminist politics in mind. 'Feminist'
in this context refers to analyses and political
interventions that address the unequal and often
violent relationships among people based on real or
perceived differences. Building upon the literature
from critical geopolitics, feminist international
relations, and transnational feminist studies, Idevelop
a framework for feminist political engagement. The
paper interrogates concepts ofhuman security and
juxtaposes them with state security, arguing for a
more accountable, embodied, and responsive notion of
geopolWcs. A feminist geopolitics is sought by
examining politics at scales other than that of the
nation-state; by challenging the public/private divide
at a global scale; and by analyzing the politics of
mobility for perpetrators ofcrimes against humanity.
As such, feminist geopolitics is a critical approach and
a contingent set ofpolitical practices operating at
scales finer and coarser than the nation-state.
Key words: feminist geography, political geography,
mobility, scale
1/ est surprenant de constater cl quel point les
echanges entre geographie feministe et geographie
poJitique sont peu nombreux. La notion d'une
geopolitique feministe demeure sous-developpee en
geographie. Ce travail a pour but de creer un espace
theorique et pratique favorisant I'emergence d'une
geopolitique feministe. La geopolitique feministe n'est
pas une theorie alternative de la geopolitique ni
I'introduaion d'un nouvel ordre spatial mais constitue
plutat une approche politique feministe ala
problematique de la mondialisation. Dans un tel
contexte, le terme reministe' fait reference Q des
analyses et interventions politiques cherchant a
comprendre comment des relations inegales et souvent
violentes peuvent etre basees sur des differences
fielles ou per~ues. M'inspirant de la litterature critique
en geopolitique, des relations internationales
feministes, et d'etudes feministes sur le fait
transnational, j'elabare un cadre prop;ce aun
engagement politique feministe. ee travail interroge
differents concepts de securite humaine et les
juxtapose avec ceux de securite d'ttat a{in de
cheminer vers une notion de geopolitique plus
responsable, plus sensible et plUS pres du corps. Une
geopolitique feministe est deployee atravers une
analyse de la politique axee sur une echelle autre que
I'Etat-Nation; en questionnant la separation du public
et du prive Q une echeJle globale; et en analysant le
probleme de la mobilite pour les individus coupables
de crimes contre I'humanite. II s'ag;t done d'une
approche critique et d'un ensemble contingent de
pratiques politiques operant cl des eche/les Q la fois
plus fine et plus grossieres que celle de I'Etat-Nation.
Mots-cles: geographie feministe, geographie politique,
mobilite, echelle
First, I would to thank the nominating committee,
Drs. Alan Nash, Damaris Rose, and Fran Klodawsky
for putting me on the podium before you today. I am
truly honoured to be here, if a bit put out that my
efforts to nominate some of you in the audience did
not succeed. I would also like to thank the adminis-
tration at my former university, Arizona State
University West, for financial support in bringing me
here, and my new colleagues in geography at Simon
Fraser University for welcoming me so warmly into
the department and back to Canada. Suzanne, her-
self, was a graduate of geography at Simon Fraser
University.
My first encounter with Suzanne was in print, in
1992, while researching a paper on immigrant home-
workers in Vancouver for Gerry Pratt's graduate class
in feminist geography (Mackenzie 1989). Suzanne's
approach resonated with my own introduction to
feminist thought in Scotland and England, if not fem-
inist geography, by Sylvia Walby in the late 1980s.
Suzanne's ideas of feminist geography demonstrated
a firm commitment to social change that would
improve women's lives, and provide "a vision of
something better for all of us" (Rose 1999, 407). Her
work identifies gender and class as two of the defin-
ing analytics of feminist geography. In Suzanne's
words, "Feminist geography, like feminism as a
whole, is not 'only' about women" (Mackenzie 1999,
419). This declaration proved to hold throughout the
19905, as geography expanded its analysis and poli-
tics well beyond a 'geography of women' or 'gender
and geography' to a thoroughly feminist geography.
Graduate school is often a time of transformation
and metamorphosis, and my experience of feminist
geography followed a cultural turn in geography as a
discipline. A largely Anglo-North American socialist
feminist geography did not prove inclusive enough
of social relations produced through differences
other than gender and class, nor did it prove analyt-
ically powerful enough to make sense of disparate
power relations in places beyond North America,
Scotland, England, New Zealand and Australia. My
early research related to industrial homeworkers in
the early 1990s, for example, highlighted the inat-
tention on the part of feminist geographers to racial-
ized and immigrant divisions of gendered labour in
relation to homework (see Ocran 1997 for positive
developments in this area). Multicultural policy in
Canada, which has served to efface questions of race
and nation, while promoting tolerance of diversity,
provides another example of the inextricably racial-
ized spaces that immigrant women occupy
(Kobayashi 1993). With this cultural turn, feminist
geographers have begun to pay serious attention to
racism and processes of racialization in their analy-
ses, highlighting the ways in which space and social
relations are mutually constituted (Kobayashi and
Peake 1994; Ruddick 1996).2 The rise of postcolonial
feminisms, and what have been referred to as 'femi-
nist geographies of difference,' marked a cultural
turn in geography (Pratt 2000). Relations other than,
but including, those of gender and class have been
given more credence: nationality, sexuality, race/eth-
nicity, caste, and ability have all come to the fore of
feminist geography.
But it was not only a longer list of differences that
rocked the foundations of feminist geography. First,
this cultural turn renewed a call for accountability to
'other' peoples and places, beyond the Euro-
American boundaries and imagination of feminist
geography. A move from feminist empiricism to
questions of identity and difference ensued
(McDowell and Sharp 1997). Second, it served to chal-
lenge and refine highly economistic accounts of paid
work in both national and global contexts. This turn
highlighted cultural as well as economic and political
connections among places and peoples. Feminist
geography has also begun to link scales - from the
foreign-born homeworker in East Vancouver with lit-
tle English official language competence, who juggles
the responsibilities of child care, household work,
and garment production in a single space - to the US-
based multinational for whom she indirectly works.
Scale is critical in structuring political action (Staeheli
1994), and the production of scale is implicated in
the production of space (Marston 2000). Third, post-
colonial and poststructuralist feminist geographies
have provided tools to examine the very ways in
which categories such as 'woman', 'immigrant', or
'Kurd' are constructed in subordination (McDowell
and Sharp 1997). By no means have the lessons and
tools of socialist feminist geography been aban-
doned. Rather, they have been reworked, strength-
ened, and redeployed. As Foord et al. (1999, 411) put
it, "...[I]n remembering Suzanne we are also remind-
ed that what she wanted is not so very different from
what many of us stiIJ passionately want today: a pol-
itics of recognition and a politics of distribution."
A cultural turn in feminist geography is well served
by socialist feminisms which ground analyses that may
otheIWise eclipse the everyday gendered geographies of
work on the job and at home (see Klodawsky et al. 1994;
Hanson and Pratt 1995; Preston 2000). Feminist
scholarship in geography has served to mesh these two
theoretical approaches by analyzing methodology and
the practical problems of conducting research (Moss
1993).lsabel Dyck (1997), for example, has document-
ed the ways in which power differentials are resisted by
research subjects. While gender and class relations con-
tribute to such disparities, so too do locations such as
immigrant status and cultural identity.
A Political Turn
The title of my talk builds on both socialist and post-
structuralist feminist scholarship in geography and
on the work of feminists in political science. I insist
on a materialist analysis of social and economic dis-
parities, and the possibility of 'doing something': of
normative engagement and action within a given
context. My argument also acknowledges the value of
interrogating dominant ways and means of produc-
ing geographical knowledge - of challenging prevail-
ing geographical stories about place - in order to
change them. What I outline today might be called a
political turn in feminist geography. Of course, femi-
nist geography is already inherently political in that
it advocates change where social relations are
inequitable, violent, or exploitative. This political
turn, then, calls for a meeting and meshing of the
small 'p' political of feminist geography with the larg-
er 'P' political of political geography.
This proposal is motivated by my work, both as a
scholar and as a refugee relief worker for a short peri-
od in 1992-93. Much of my scholarship to date has
examined patterns of displacement and responses to
forced migration (Hyndman 2000), but I feel this
approach is incomplete because it focuses less on the
power relations that force people from their homes
than the geographical outcomes of such violence.
Having witnessed the very visceral pain of people out
of place and analyzed the international processes
and programs invoked to alleviate such suffering, I
aim to link scales and analyze the forces that give
rise to such human suffering in order to develop a
more accountable, embodied, and responsive notion
of geopolitics, a feminist geopolitics.
While feminist geographies of difference have pro-
liferated since the late 1980s, the idea of a feminist
political geography broadly speaking, or a feminist
notion of geopolitics on a global scale, have
remained at best an imagined geography, marginal
within both feminist and political geography. Ten
years ago Linda Peake and Eleonore Kofman pub·
lished, "Into the 1990s: a gendered agenda for politi-
cal geography" in Political Geography. At that time,
these authors lamented the lack of a feminist analy·
sis within political geography and proceeded to
showcase the work of feminists who did 'political'
work. They (Kofman and Peake 1990, 315) defined
politics as "an activity relevant to all spheres of pub-
lic and private life," and yet, by example, such a def-
inition was not shared by the leading journal in the
subdiscipline, Political Geography. When the feminist
geography journal, Gender, Place and Culture, was
launched in the early 1990s, it did not have politics
in the title. likewise, in the 1999 draft chapter for
political geography in the Geography in America
tome, there is virtually no mention of feminist geog-
raphy. More optimistically, however, a section on sex-
uality and space is included. Feminist geographer
Lynn Staeheli (1999) has lamented the paucity of con-
nections between feminist geography and political
geography, and the persistence of these two soli-
tudes. The political turn I propose aims to traverse
these very distinct parts of geography. I do thiS with
a focus on geopolitics at the transnational, or global,
scale.3
My goal in the remaining minutes is to sketch a
hypothetical entry for feminist geopolitics for, say,
the next edition of the Dictionary of Human
Geography. Such an entry would ideally appear
under 'feminist geography' and under 'geopolitics'. I
will begin with a few definitions and then outline
some contributions to geography that are both femi-
nist and political. Using both Canadian examples and
illustrations from further afar, I aim to ground the
concept of feminist geopolitics.
Feminist geopolitics, in my view, spans a range of
subjects and scales, from the global economy in
which Mexican women work in multinational
maquiladoras, sewing Jantzen swimwear for $6 day
(work that was once done in Vancouver); to national-
ist projects in which Bosnian Muslim women are
raped in camps; to cosmopolitan Canadian cities
where refugees from places like Burma negotiate new
identities based on their connections to more than
one place and struggle to support those left behind
in Thai refugee camps. Each of these examples illus-
trates the ways in which relations of power at differ-
ent scales (global, national, urban) are linked. They
illustrate that global processes, whether economic,
political, or socio·cultural. are experienced in local-
ized, everyday, embodied ways.
Definitions
For the purposes of my hypothetical dictionary
entry, I define the 'feminist' part as analyses and
political interventions that address the unequal and
often violent relationships among people based on
real or perceived social, economic, political, and cul-
tural differences.4 There is more than one kind of
feminism, and I do not wish to fix the notion of fem-
inist in any singular manner.s Nor do I want to sug-
gest that feminist geopolitics is a new theory of
geopolitics or a new order of space. To avoid a sin-
gular notion of feminist politics, I will refer to a fem-
inist geopolitical analytic or imaginary.6
None of the definitions of geopolitics, as outlined
in the new Dictionary of Human Geography
Oohnston et al. 2000), begin to describe the notion of
geopolitics I want to offer here, one that is account-
able to people who occupy particular places, not only
states; one that is responsive to groups rendered vul-
nerable by conflict, not to ethnocentric accounts of
West and East; and one that bespeaks fair play and
change where warranted for those who man and
woman the global economy, not an abstract core-
periphery problem or merely an issue of locational
rationalization in a world dominated by multination-
al corporations. Don't get me wrong: the relations of
power promulgated by geographically footloose
multinational corporations are an important focus of
geography, but what I seek here is an embodied fem-
inist geopolitical perspective that examines the
implications of such mobility for the places and peo-
ple on the ground, a perspective qUick to analyze and
document relationships that are blatantly exploita-
tive or violent and to change them.
In the current edition of the Dictionary of Human
Geography, Graham Smith (2000) outlines four per-
spectives under the geopolitics entry:
I Traditional geopolitics, a la Halford Mackinder
2 Power-relations perspective, the realist school of
international relations theory
3 Political economy approach
4 Critical geopolitics
Of these, only one perspective provides analytical
tools and insight into the feminist geopolitical per-
spective. While many feminists in political science
and a handful in geography have proVided sustained
and incisive critique of international relations (JR)
theory (Peterson 1992; Pettman 1996), these analyses
have failed to go beyond the narratives of interna-
tional relations. That is, feminist critics and IR pro-
ponents alike are working within a modern problem-
atic of geopolitics that Is insufficient.
It is the scholarship of critical geopolitics that
proves most useful to feminist geographers. Critical
geopolitics is a sub-field of political geography that
emerged In the late 1980s, of which Canadian geog-
rapher Simon Dalby (1991) has been a major propo-
nent. Critical geopolitics Is a useful departure point
and antecedent to a feminist geopolitical imaginary.
Drawing inspiration from the work of Michel
Foucault and jacques Derrida. critical geopolitics is
less a theory of how space and politics intersect than
a taking apart of normalized categories and narra-
tives of geopolitics. Critical geopolitics is about ques-
tioning assumptions in a taken-for-granted world and
examining the institutional modes of producing such
a world vis-a-Vis writing about the world, its geogra-
phy and politics.
Within the rubric of critical geopolitics, Dalby
(I994) documents feminist research and demon-
strates the ways in which geopolitical categories of
security are gendered. He reminds readers of the
gender-blind analysis of much IR theory. His com-
prehensive overview of gender and feminism in IR
underscores the relative absence of feminist voices
in this area of geography, with notable exceptions
(Kofman and Peake 1990; 5taeheli 1994; Kofman
1996; Sharp 1996).
While critical geopolitics is useful for a feminist
geopolitical analysis, its deconstructive impulses are
insufficient to generate change for building alterna-
tive futures. With a few exceptions (Dalby 1994;
Sparke 1996), the scholarship on critical geopolitics
ignores the gendered landscape of dominant geopo-
litical debates. Critical geopolitics decentres the
nation-state and exposes the investments that our
dominant geopolitical narratives embody, but it does
not put Humpty Dumpty back together again, so to
speak. Nor does it question why Humpty is always
falling off the wall. We are left with well-interrogated
but tacitly masculinist categories, and no clear way
forward in practice.
So, what steps could be taken to forge a feminist
geopolitical approach? I will mention just three, and
then elaborate briefly on each:
1 Shifting scales to employ analyses both finer and
coarser than that ofthe nation-state orglobal economy;
2 Transposing feminist analyses of the public/pri-
vate divide to a transnational scale; and
3 Employing mobility as an analytiC of geopolitical
power and accountability.
Shifting Scales
Instead of focusing on the security of states, as inter-
national relations theory tends to do, a feminist
geopolitics focuses more on the security of persons.
Feminists have noted the lack of attention to gender
at the intersection of international relations theory
and critical geopolitics, one that reiterates an issue
long raised by feminists: 'security for whom?' This is
a vital question for feminist geopolitics because state
security and human security are not necessarily syn-
onymous. The security of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia in 1999 was not at all synonymous with
the security of a segment of its citizenry, namely eth-
nic Albanian Kosovars. As the Kosovars' experience
so vividly illustrates, state-sponsored violence can be
waged against targeted groups of citizens, forcing
them to flee for their lives. A feminist geopolitical
approach unsettles the conventions of state security
by introducing both finer and coarser scales of analy-
sis as well as action. Security of person for Kosovars
precedes the security of violent states from a femi-
nist geopolitical approach. From the same perspec-
tive, the insecurity caused by NATO attacks on civil-
ians and civilian installations renders it an unaccept-
able strategy for providing stability. As an approach,
and not a theory or strategy, feminist geopolitics
insists upon the contingency of place, people, and
context in making change.
To ground the idea of shifting scales, I now turn to
an analysis of 'human security', a central part of
Canadian foreign policy at the present time. 'Human
security' is a relatively recent concept in foreign pol-
icy and multilateral affairs, one which has been
adopted by the Canadian Government as part of it
peace-building initiative. .It stems from the 1994
United Nations Development Program's (UNDP)
Human Development Report in which a broad notion
of security is advocated, encompassing economic
security, food security, health security, environmen-
tal security, and has personal, community, and polit-
ical dimensions (DFAIT 2000).
Human security, in theory, disaggregates the
broader notion of security to a finer scale at which
smaller political constituencies and vulnerable
groups become visible. Human security, as Canadian
foreign policy, stands alongside but is distingUished
from state security. It disaggregates and shifts the
focus of state security to a finer scale, namely that of
individuals and groups. To the extent that human
security accomplishes this task of redefining scale, it
can be considered part of feminist geopolitical ana-
lytic that aims to reconstitute the territorial founda-
tion upon which security is based. and exposes those
who are effaced or harmed by policies in the name of
state or global securityJ Its attention to the security
of individuals and groups in the broadest sense high-
lights the importance of scale to political struggle
(Staeheli 1994).
Scale is "a contingent outcome of the tensions that
exist between structural forces and the practices of
human agents" (Marston 2000, 220). The theory of
human security thus proves harder to implement.
The persecution of ethnic Albanian Kosovars by the
Serbian government of Slobodan Milosevic provided
an opportunity for the implementation of human
security principles. To the extent that the NATO inter-
vention was predicated on the belief that the rights
of an ethnic and religious minority under siege pre-
vailed over the right of a sovereign state to govern
and take independent action within its borders, the
decision upheld the principal of human security and
safety of a persecuted minority. The means of inter-
vention, NATO air strikes on Serbia beginning in
March 1999, however, is much more problematic
from a human security perspective, as violence
against Kosovars and Serbian civilians escalated with
the NATO attacks. Serbian violence against Kosovar
Albanians was used to warrant the suspension of
Yugoslav state sovereignty for the purpose of NATO's
bombing: indirectly, NATO state-sponsored violence
was met with Serbian state-sponsored Violence.
Human security is susceptible to politicization. In
this case, it was used as a justification for interven-
tion, a move that, in turn, caused further insecurity,
putting in jeopardy the very lives of Kosovars. The
tactical and geographical logic behind the NATO
attacks has been widely criticized.
The either/or binary offered up by Western leaders
dUring the Kosovo crisis represented a very limited
geopolitical imagination: either attack the Serbs, or
ethnic Albanians in Kosovo will be annihilated.s A
number of feminist groups worldWide, in particular
Women in Black, noted that "neither/nor" was an
option that received little attention (Cockburn 2000).
A military aerial attack was presented as the obvious
if not only option (Figure 1).
That the UN Security Council did not authorize the
NATO attacks is significant. Protecting state sover-
eignty and refusing the precedent of international
humanitarian intervention in a 'rogue' nation were
crucial issues for two of the five permanent countries
of the Security Council: China and Russia. Each has
its own so-called 'domestic' conflict with the Tibetan
independence movement and Chechen rebels respec-
tively. Let me interrogate this idea of domestic versus
international politics, and suggest that the divide is
an arbitrary one that does not necessarily serve to
ensure safety among civilian populations.
Challenging the Public/Private Divide
Feminists within and beyond geography have long
challenged the demarcation of a private/public
divide, particularly the social and spatial separation
of unpaid work at home versus paid work in the pub-
lic sphere. and the idea that citizenship is gendered
because of its primary location in the public space.
The politics of public and private, however, have
been less scrutinized at a global scale. Some entry
points into such an analysis are worth mentioning;
let me provide three examples.
First, a significant shift in world affairs is occur.
ring whereby the security of persons has been put
on more equal footing with sovereignty and the
security of states. While international law and the
discourse of human rights have long existed, their
mobilization by states, regional bodies, and supras-
tate organizations, such as the UN Security Council,
appears to be increasing. The principles associated
with human security, for example. fall into this cat-
egory: the idea that state security is but one of sev-
eral axes of security that traverse a number of
scales.
The contradiction between state security and the
security of persons can be traced to the potentially
contradictory terms enshrined in the UN Charter and
the UN Declaration of Human Rights. While the UN
Charter has mechanisms to ensure the protection
and enforcement of peace and international securi-
ty, there are no similar duties or obligations in the
Charter for the protection of human rights. Instead,
these are outlined in the legaJly non-binding UN
Declaration of Human Rights. However, interpreta-
tion of the Charter by the UN Security Council over
the past decade has extended the meaning of what
constitutes a threat to international peace and secu-
rity, and has thus extended the geographical scope
of what counts as public. Previously, the domestic
affairs of states were seen to be private matters,
beyond the purview of the Charter's provisions.
Where threats to international peace and security
were once predicated on attacks by states against
other states, they now include threats made by a
state against segments of its own population.
Sovereignty is qualified, and the abrogation of peo-
ple's rights within a given state are no longer a
domestic matter. The geographical scope of the
Charter has shifted.
A second example of the way in which
private/public divides are being challenged is
through the international legal system, specificaJly
by the two War Crimes Tribunals for the Former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda.9 In June 1996, for the first
time in history, the tribunal for Yugoslavia prose-
cuted rape as a weapon of war and a 'crime against
humanity'" (Kirshenbaum et al. 1997, 64). It issued
indictments for the arrest of eight men, charged
with sexual assault for the purposes of torture and
enslavement. Ample evidence that men used rape
to terrorize, humiliate, and contaminate the women
of opposing ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina
led to the indictments. Io "To rape women with
impunity and to mark their bodies with the symbols
of the other side is to assert domination and to
symbolically assault ethnic identity in its most pro-
tected space" (Coomaraswamy 1999, 10). Men were
also raped and sexually mutilated; in some cases
they were forced to rape or sexually mutilate other
men (Pettman 1996). People's bodies are construed
as territory and become the sites of public violence
on which symbolic constructions of the nation and
its boundaries take place (ibid.; CUes and Hyndman
forthcoming).
The ruling that rape is a weapon of war, however,
is significant because it publicizes sexual violence
as a weapon of war. Sexual violence and rape are as
old as war itself, but until now these issues have
been rendered invisible or incidental because they
were dismissed as private acts, the "aberrational
practices of errant soldiers" (Coomaraswamy 1999,
3). The tacit theatre of war was the battlefield, the
public space around which the rules of war - the
Geneva Conventions - have been written. But the
public/private divide between the battlefield and
civilian bodies has dissolved. People's bodies,
homes, communities, and livelihoods have become
the battlefields of contemporary conflict. By identi-
fying rape as a strategic weapon of war, its violence
is recorded as a public act and punishment for such
crimes is legitimized. Rape is not simply an addi-
tion to international humanitarian and human
rights law. It represents a new category of crime
that reorganizes the scale and scope of punish-
ment, and recasts what counts (that which is public)
and what does not (that which is considered pri-
vate). The safety of the body as the finest scale of
geopolitical space is politicized.
A third example of the perils of public/private
divides is evidence of spousal or wife abuse recently
reported among families in the Canadian Armed
Forces (Mitrovica and Sallot 2000). Despite an infor-
mal zero-tolerance policy towards spousal abuse, the
report - based on 126 interviews with survivors of
violence at home - documents that many abused
women were driven into silence because comman-
ders believed such issues would be best dealt with in
the civilian justice system (Muriel McQueen
Fergusson Centre for Family Violence Research et al.
2000). The research reveals that a code of solidarity
exist among armed forces personnel, so that mem-
bers did not go forth with public prosecution against
their fellow soldiers. This privatization of violence to
the domain of the family was further exacerbated, in
my estimation, by commanders' preference that such
charges be dealt with by the civilian justice system,
relegating spousal abuse to yet another domain
beyond the army's jurisdiction.
Vulnerability to abuse is accentuated by geo-
graphical isolation from friends and relatives, and
economic dependence on a sole male breadwinner.
Rendering visible and public the experience of
those abused represents a first step towards
addressing the violence and power relations among
military families. Further research on the culture
and training of armed forces personnel in Canada is
needed to connect the domains of militarized mas-
culinity at work with the performance of masculini-
ty at home.
Mobility and Accountability
Employing mobility as an analytic of geopolitical
power opens up possibilities for feminist politics.
People's mobility varies tremendously across race,
gender, class, nationality, immigrant status, ability,
and many other factors. Gender and socio-economic
status shape mobility in important ways. My past
research has analyzed the differential access of
Somali and Sudanese refugees in Kenya to Canadian
and Australian visa posts where they can apply for
resettlement overseas. Refugee camps based in rural
Northeast Kenya are far from the application office
for the Canadian and Australian High Commissions
in Nairobi, making access for those who must care
for children in the camps and/or those without the
means to travel to Nairobi much more restricted
(Hyndman 2000).
Furthermore, the forced migration of internally dis-
placed persons (lOPs) and refugees is an increasingly
pressing issue. There are some 14 million refugees
and 21 million IDPs world-wide (US Committee for
Refugees 2000). The geography of their displacement
is uneven, but in all cases is closely related to condi-
tions of state terror, conflict, and/or violence. As Ken
Hewitt (2001) has pointed out, "such issues are virtu-
ally absent from our academic literature [in geogra-
phy]." Hewitt's analysis of Pinochet and Kropotkin in
this volume begins to fill the gap in understanding
the processes that perpetrate violence. shape mobili-
ty, and generate displacement.
Mobility not only provides a basis to ana]yze
power relations across space and among groups with
lesser or greater social or economic status, but con-
trolling mobility can also be the basis of political
intervention against those who have abused power.
One can specify a 'geo-politics of mobility' that calls
for an integrated analysis of political networks and
nodes of financial power within the global economy,
power relations that shape the mobility of particular
groups or individuals (Hyndman 1997). The mobility
of people indicted for war crimes and other crimes
against humanity is increasingly restricted. To the
extent that perpetrators of such violence are geo-
graphically confined and forced to answer for their
actions within the context of their civil society, and
local institutions of justice where possible, such con-
finement can serve feminist ends. Such immobility
can allow for a more accountable, embodied, and
responsive notion of geopolitics.
The recent spat among European countries about
the fate of General Augusto Pinochet provides a good
example of the critical role mobility plays in meting
out justice across scales. l1 On October 16, 1998,
General Pinochet was arrested in London While seek-
ing medical treatment. Awarrant issued by a Spanish
judge outlined some 35 charges of torture and con-
spiracy to torture, as grounds for arrest and extradi-
tion. Some Spanish citizens were among the tortured
(Crossette 1999). In March 1999, the Law Lords in
Britain ruled that General Pinochet's arrest was law-
ful, opening the way for an extradition hearing. In a
partial victory for Pinochet, they said he is not
answerable for charges of human rights abuse com-
mitted before 1988 when Britain incorporated the UN
convention on torture into law. More than 3000 peo-
ple were executed or disappeared during the
Pinochet dictatorship. By October 1999, a British
court ruled that General Pinochet could be extradited
to Spain to stand trial there on charges. In January
2000, a British High Court judge issued a verdict sup-
porting the British government's decision to release
General Pinochet. He added that "in legal, if some-
what peremptory terms, it is none of their [the com-
plainants'] business" (Hoge 2000). Belgium immedi-
ately appealed the judgement, countering the judge's
attempt to privatize the issue as a British-only mat-
ter. Despite the efforts of several countries, Pinochet
was allowed to fly home to Chile in March 2000,12 On
January 31, 2001, he was served with an order for
house arrest which is being appealed on the basis of
ill-health (The New York Times 2001).
Regardless of Pinochet's return to Chile and his fate
there, a valuable legal precedent has been set for the
human rights movement, one which is potentially
valuable to a feminist geopolitics concerned with gen-
erating parameters of accountability and rendering
places and peoples safer: former heads of state do not
enjoy immunity from prosecution for systematic
atrocities. "It is a shame that Pinochet may never have
to stand trial, but the very fact that he was arrested
and that his crimes were presented before a court has
already changed the calculus of dictators all over the
world" (Brody cited in Knox 2000),13 Whether thiS will
give would-be dictators pause for reflection is uncer-
tain, but there remains the political possibility that
perpetrators of heinous crimes will be deterred from
committing such acts at best and will not be able to
move freely dUring their lives in exile at a minimum.
Based in large part on the Pinochet case, the mobility
of former heads of state who commit such atrocities
is increasingly restricted. I4
-- ---~--------------------------------------,
This precedent has broad mobility implications for
all kinds of people who might have committed
crimes against humanity or war crimes for which
they have not been held accountable. In August of
1999, Vienna city councilman, Peter Pilz, discovered
that Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri - a man with a deplorable
record of human rights violations as Saddam
Hussein's deputy - was in Vienna for medical treat-
ment. Mr. Pilz promptly filed a criminal complaint
with Austrian authorities and within 48 hours, Mr.
Ibrahim fled «(rossette 1999). Usually, it is refugees
who flee, not dictators. A week later, also in Vienna,
General Momir Talic was detained by Austrian
authorities as an indicted war crimes suspect. This
was the first time a sealed indictment had led to an
arrest outside Bosnia. The chief of staff of the
Bosnian Serb army had been in town for a conference
at the National Defense Academy, and was unaware
that he had been charged in a secret indictment with
crimes against humanity during the 1992-95 Bosnian
War.
While the forced migration of civilians because of
war, persecution, and violence continues, it is
increasingly those responsible for such scatterings
who are the target of mobility checks and human
rights enforcement when these suspects go beyond
the boundaries of their safe countries. Under former
President Suharto's rule, Indonesia invaded East
Timor in 1976 and imposed repressive rule on its
people until he left office in 1998. A leading Jakarta
paper reports that former President Suharto, who
was forced from office after three decades of auto-
cratic rule, was under investigation by the new
Indonesian government. Mr. Suharto, 78, lives at
home in Indonesia but had been expected to seek
medical treatment in Germany, where he has trav-
elled in the past for a stroke and internal bleeding in
July 1999. People dose to the family told Thejakarta
Post that travel outside of Indonesia was unlikely due
to potential warrants for his arrest «(rossette 1999).
Mr. Suharto has since been too sick to stand trial,
despite requests to that effect.
And finally, the Ethiopian government has called
on South Africa to extradite its former president.
Mengistu Haile Mariam, to face charges of human
rights violations (The New York TImes 1999a).
Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe in 1991 when his gov-
ernment was overthrown after sixteen years in
power. He sought medical treatment for a heart ail-
ment in South Africa late in 1999. The South African
foreign ministry first announced that Mr. Mengistu,
62, would not be extradited to Ethiopia where he
faces charges of mass killings of political opponents.
He was considered, ironically, a refugee (The New
York Times 1999b). A week later, under pressure from
human rights groups, the South African government
agreed to review Ethiopia's request to extradite the
exiled dictator (The New York TImes 1999c). The mat-
ter is pending. Each of these scenarios introduces the
political problems of geography faced by political
leaders guilty of abusing power.
Many former dictators who have blood on their
hands still enjoy exile in countries that agree to host
them. Idi Amin, for example, lives safely in saudi
Arabia without threat of extradition. Where war
crimes and crimes against humanity have gone
unpunished because their perpetrators hide behind
sympathetic borders, these perpetrators are increas-
ingly being questioned the moment they cross such
boundaries. One unintended consequence of this
new political will to see justice served is the increas-
ingly restricted mobility of perpetrators; those who
have abused their power potentially face a geography
of containment in their home country, or within a few
allied states. The charges outlined in the scenarios
above span the political spectrum, from right to left,
and while selective, they do not simply signal a
strategic reinactment of foreign policy to national
ends.
The Pinochet ruling has raised concern among for-
mer American officials that they too could some day
be extradited. Dliver North acknowledged that "It (the
Pinochet ruling] limits my travel to certain countries"
(Blair 2000). But the same kinds of crimes deal dif-
ferent outcomes when the perpetrator comes from
the world's sole remaining superpower: "The political
reality is that it [arrest] is very remote....Why?
Because we are the superpower. It would be very dan-
gerous for another country to do that economically,
politically and otherwise," says Jonathan (harney, a
law professor at Vanderbilt University. Patricia
Derian, the US first assistant secretary of state for
human rights, counters that she can foresee the day
when American officials would be prosecuted for
acts similar to those attributed to James Baker, Dliver
North, and Henry Kissinger (ibid.). As before, univer-
sal standards or rights of citizenship never apply
equally across space. 15
The limits of international law are being tested in
new ways that challenge current thinking in feminist
and political geography. The link between mobility
and rights remains an under-explored area of geo-
graphical research (Blomley 1994), as is the relation-
ship between mobility and displacement. What work
has been done with respect to rights tends to focus
on the important social differences in accessing
mobility rights within a national context where such
rights are constitutionally enshrined. But the link
between mobility and rights can be forged from
another angle and at different scales. The preceding
examples suggest that once powerful leaders who
now constitute an elite class of itinerant exiled dicta-
tors are not as free to move as they would have been
had they not [allegedly] abrogated the rights of oth-
ers during their tenure of political leadership. In thiS
view, mobility for perpetrators of heinous crimes is
restricted as states refuse to guarantee their protec-
tion when they enter their countries. Human securi-
ty. while geographically uneven. appears to take
precedence over sovereign leaders and matters of
state security. After the Pinochet drama in Europe, it
is clear that much of Europe would be off limits to
former presidents such as the now-deceased Mobutu
Sese Seko of Zaire, who spent more time in Europe
than his own country.
How consistent are such attempts to redress injUS-
tice across space and political context? Not all coun-
tries are as vigilant as others. A 1994 Canadian
Supreme Court ruling upheld the acquittal of
Hungarian police captain. Imre Finta, on grounds that
he was merely following orders when he deported
Jews to death camps, despite codification in interna-
tional law that 'following orders' does not exempt a
person from responsibility for his/her actions (Knox
1999). On a more positive note. in West Africa. courts
in Senegal recently indicted Hissene Habre, the exiled
former dictator of Chad on charges of torture. The
indictment is the first in which a former African head
of state has been charged with human rights viola-
tions by the court of another country.16 Senegal is a
signatory to the UN Convention Against Torture that
obliges, but does not enforce, states to prosecute or
extradite torturers who enter their territories. 17
I do not simply endorse punitive measures of jus-
tice at international tribunals. Such 'universal' norms
of justice are unavoidably ethnocentric and politi-
cal,18 Where possible, national and local institutions
of justice or methods of reconciliation are often
preferable. Responsibility for collective guilt. and
subsequent social change, for example. is more like-
ly to be taken seriously by a nation that tries itself in
the context of its own civil institutions, than by a for-
eign court that prosecutes the leaders of that nation.
The politics of containment that these arrests shape
serves feminist geopolitical political goals to the
extent that local, national, and sometimes interna-
tional approaches to justice can be meted out. A fem-
inist geopolitical project relies upon a commitment
to the safety and well-being of persons rather than
states, but also on a healthy civil society with good
access to information. strong independent media,
and active non-governmental organizations that do
not tolerate systematic acts of Violence against its cit-
izenry.
A Concluding Remark
In closing, a feminist geopolitics does not promote a
new theory of geopolitics. It does not usher in a new
order of space, nor advocate an alternative universal
standard of practice. Rather, it embodies an approach
that advocates a finer scale of 'security' accountable
to people, as individuals and groups, and analyzes
the spaces of violence that traverse public/private
distinctions. A feminist geopolitical approach exam-
ines mobility in terms of access and accountability. It
does not aim to endorse a single set of judicial prac-
tices or institutions. nor even a punitive approach to
justice. but does underscore a quest to improve the
security of people at the finest scale by strengthen-
ing the institutions of civil society in situ. By asking,
'security for whom?' a feminist geopolitical analytic
identifies the geographically and historically contin-
gent practices which promote the security of per-
sons, and reconstructs geopolitics as we know them.
Notes
I The following address was presented at the 2000 Canadian
Association of Geographers (CAG) conference in memory of Dr.
Suzanne Mackenzie; it has been lightly edited to incorporate answers
to questions posed at the end of the presentation, and in response to
thoughtful comments by two anonymous reviewers.
2 My reliance on Canadian feminist geographers in this talk is not acci-
dental. My work Is heavily indebted to the scholarship and actions of
feminist geographers in this country.
3 Transnational theoriZing departs from the assumption that nations,
states, or communities can be treated as spatially independent enti·
ties (see Hyndman and Walton-Roberts, 2000).
4 Gender remains a central concern of feminist politics and thought.
however. its primacy over other positionings is not fixed across time
and place. Daiva Stasiulis (1999, 194) elaborates on the importance of
relationality, positionality, and 'relational positionality' to feminist
politics: "They refer to the multiple relations of power that intersect
in complex ways to position Individuals and colJectivities in shifting
and often contradictory locations within geopolitical spaces. histori-
cal narratives, and movement politics." Stasiulus maintains that
"Central to my interpretation of relational positionality Is also a rejec-
tion of postructuralist deconstructions that deny the material bases
for power relations, however complicated their discursive represen-
tations" (ibid., 196). I would agree with Stasiulus here, though argue
that poststructuralist analyses do not categorically deny the material
bases of power relations. and that they can in fact reveal the process-
es by which particular constellations of power are are effaced or nat-
uralized.
As Vera Chouinard (2001) has argued, struggles against the margin-
alization of citizens disadvantaged by embodied differences such as
race, gender, and mental or physical impairment, often focus on legal
rights.
6 A feminist imaginary is a universe of politically possible interven-
tions, actions, and alliances. It encompasses the possibility of both
alternative modernities and the very concrete expressions of or
changes within a specific modernity. In my view, It differs from the-
ory in that it encompasses contingent normative engagements and
thus offers a more embodied and accountable politics. The distinc-
tion between a universe of potential modes of engagement (my
notion of feminist geopolitics) and universallst notions of what
engagement should look like (in which modernitY is singular and sta-
tus quo) is another way to get at this difference. DiIlp Parameshwar
Gaonkar (1999) argues for site-based readings of modernity that
resist any inexorable logic assigned to modernitY. Each national and
cultural site represents a contingent formation based on local politics
and culture. Charles Taylor (1999, 162) adds that "modernity, taking
place in different civilizations, will produce different results that
reflect their divergent starting points..., instead of speaking of
modernity in the singular, we should better speak of 'alternative
modernities'." I thank Prlti Ramamurthy for her insights on alterna-
tive modernities in response to some of the ideas voiced here.
In the context of critical geopolitics, Matt Sparke (2000) argues that
there are 'real-worlders' and more critical geographers who are com·
mitted to revealing the relations of power which undelWTite the
knowledge production of 'real-worlders'. The real-worlders are
unable to question the premises on which their knowledge Is enabled
and limited. A feminist geopolitical imaginary, then, begins with the
idea that certain geopolitical stories and practices dominate and that
their investments can be exposed through critical analysis. But this is
not sufficient. There is also a real-world component, one that
employs other notions of modernity and of historically and geo-
graphically contingent engagement in feminist process, response,
and coordinated action. This might involve. as I indicate, restricting
the mobility of those who violate others in violent and systematic
ways.
7 Upholding the human rights of individuals, including economic,
social, and cultural rights, human security in theory Improves upon
the Western bias on civil and political rights since WWIJ, and provides
a more comprehensive basis for foreign policy and practice.
S A sustained critique of such dualist thinking can be found in
Kobayashi and Peake (1994).
9 One criticism of this talk revolved around the very 'humanist' notions
of justice and politics described. While I understand the limitations
of what I have called 'UN humanism', I am not simply endorsing the
ways in which justice is meted out by the international war crimes tri-
bunals. As Dianne Martin and Mark Drumbl have written, "the
increased criminalization of gendered crimes and hate crimes repre-
sents a reinforcement of retributive criminal justice model", one that
may well be counter-intuitive to feminist politics (Drumbl 2000, 22).
One must consider the context of such crimes and the goals of any
response: is the aim reconciliation among segments of a shattered
society? Is it punishment, so that by prosecuting perpetrators a local
sense of justice is achieved, and civil society can resume? Is the aim
political, I.e. to bring major war criminals to 'justice' for the satisfac-
tion of certain allied governments on a more International scale? I
thank Adrienne Burk for her inslghts on these geographles of justice
and collective memory. Thanks also to Dan Hiebert for making me
think much more about these issues.
lOAn estimated 20,000 women endured sexual assaults in the fonn of
torture and rape during the war In Bosnla-Herzegovina (salzman
1998). In Rwanda, the estimated number of rapes in the context of
genocide is 250,000 (Drumbl, 2000).
11 The geography of state terror imposed by Plnochet was adroitly ana-
lyzed by Ken Hewitt In his John WHey Lecture at the Annual Meeting
of the Canadian AssociatIon of Geographers in June 2000 (see Hewitt,
2001).
12 Asserting Chile's sovereignty in the matter, former president, Eduardo
Frel [replaced in March 2000 by Ricardo Lagos of the Socialist Party),
argued that the attempts to extradite and prosecute General Pinochet
are unnecessary because he could just as easily stand trial in Chile.
While a senior Chilean judge has sent Pinochet questions about his
Involvement in the various crimes for future trials, human rights
activists are skeptical about Frel's claim because no judge in Chile has
challenged the parliamentary immunity against prosecution that
General Pinochet has as senator-far-life (Krauss 1999)
Since the arrest of P1nochet abroad, twenty-five Chilean officers at
home have been arrested on various charges of murder, kidnapping,
and torture, including sexual slavery, electric shock treatments, and
beatings. "And Government officials privately predict that a long list
of generals and other officers once though untouchable will be arrest-
ed during the next year" (Krauss 1999). General Umberto Gardon, a
member of General Pinochet's four-man junta and chief of his secret
police, was arrested in September 1999, making him the highest rank-
Ing military officer ever to be detained and prosecuted in Chile. While
some speculate that the arrest of Pinochet in Britain sparked a more
activist judicial system at home, an important Supreme Court decision
In July 1999 provides hard evidence of more liberal civilian judiciary.
The Court upheld a decision that an amnesty declared by the fonner
Pinochet government to protect military officers from the crimes corn·
mitted between the 1973 coup against Mr. Allende and March 1978
was no longer applicable to cases In which people had disappeared.
Until bodies could be accounted for, the crimes were not murder but
kidnapping, meaning that the original crime was a continuing event
beyond the 1978 deadline. In the Chilean context then, there is no
place to hide: to flee is to be arrested, as in General Pinochet's case,
but to stay home also may involve the redress of past injustices for
many perpetrators of crimes against humanity. In August 2000, The
New York Times reported that, 'The Chilean Supreme Court voted In
secret today to strip Gen. Augusto Pinochet of his senatoriallmmuni-
ty, according to local radio and web site accounts. The decision would
remove the last legal obstacle to a full-scale criminal investigation of
the former dictator and would permit his trial on charges of kidnap-
ping, murder and torture" (Krauss 2000).
13 This calculus of mobility can be read as an expression of modern
geopolitics: "[a]n essential aspect of the modern attitude to pain rests
on a calculus that defines appropriate actlonsd (Asad 1997, 303). just
as torture is defined by an excess of violent and/or degrading treat-
ment, so too is mobility a matter of measure.
14 My focus on mobility In this brief talk belies much larger questions
about what mechanisms would best serve the goals of social justice,
national memory, and collective responsibility where government
institutions, and not simply indiViduals, perpetrated crimes against
humanity. Whether international war crimes tribunals, local trials, or
truth commissions are most appropriate begs further analysis
regarding the purpose of seeking 'Justice', the practicalities of what is
possible, and the circumstances surrounding the alleged crimes.
15 US intransigence in ratifying UN conventions is also well-known.
International treaties undergo extensive examination and scrutiny
before they are ratified in the United States; it can take several years
for a treaty to be ratified after it is signed. For example, the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide took more than 30 years to be ratified by the United States,
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women, which was signed by the United States 17 years ago,
still has not been ratified. Signed by the U.S. just over two years ago,
the Convention on the Rights of the Child has also not been ratified.
Nor has the US become a signatory to the International Criminal
Court, a proposed permanent international tribunal initiated in 1998.
Some governments believe that US opposition may give the court
more credibility when it is established, while others argue that it
reproduces a retributive and punitive criminal justice paradigm that
may be counter-intuitive to feminist politics (Drumbl, 2000).
Nonetheless, the countries that are signatories represent areas that
would be 'out of bounds' for people indicted for war crimes and
crimes against humanity.
16 Senegal was, at the time, heading into an election.
17 International human rights instruments are crucial to these indict·
ments and prosecutions. They include the Convention on the Crime
of Genocide (1948); the Convention on the Elimination of
Discrimination Against Women (1979), the Conventions Against
Torture (984), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989), and
the Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998) (see Bruderlein
1999).
18 The recent election of Vojilslav Kostunica as the new president of the
Federal Republic of YugoslaVia marks the end of the Milosevic era.
Kostunica has, however, made it clear that he views the Hague as an
anti-Serb, pro-American court and has vowed not to send Mr.
Milosevic there (Erlanger 2000). The US C0t:lgress, In turn, approved
an aid package to Serbia in October 2000, contingent upon
Kostunica's cooperation in apprehending those indicted on charges
of war crimes, in particular, Mr. Milosevic (Holmes 2000). On June,
2001, the Yugoslav cabinet adopted a decree committing itself to
sending the former president, Slobodan Milosevic, to the United
Nations tribunal in The Hague to face trial on charges of war crimes.
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